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ABSTRACT: This paper considers a central objection to evolutionary epistemology. The
bject.ion is thnt bi<ilogicijl and epistemic dt-vd op niellt are not 1m,1I goui.;. i;ince while
~iologk·.il ,iritition is blind. ~pis:temf.c v~ria tio.11 i~ !'IOL. ·1 1e • em~r tio11 f hypoth~es.
unl rl.c the •ene.ration of genotyp , i n I random. W argw Hro t lh" obj«:tion is
m~gucded and ~hotv bm the cc'Illl'lll analogy of c\•ol1.1 1ioaary epi'.1.lcmology can he: pre~rvet . The core of our reply i~ lhat m1,1ctl epir;t meet vari@U n ' irt<lcecd dlrecled y
lleul'iotLic:,;, but L11esc llemi sl 'CS are analogo u.~ ~ biolog;i el pret1daptatit ns which a :ecoun1
for Hu: cvo!uti n or 1."0mp!ex o l)~an -, We 11l.w a.rgu IJuU many of thr:se heu m tiefi 0 1·
MCJ>is1emlc prcadaptatiou~" arc no1 innate but wl:'rt 1hcm e!YC'S generated ll
proce-s.1. t1f
blind varialiQn and s,ele<:live rc1en1ion.
KEY WORDS: Evolutionary epistemology, heuristics, preadaptation, variation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Evolutionary epistemology is an approach to the theory of knowledge that
is based on an analogy between epistemic development and biological
evolution. Beyond this, however, the phrase "evolutionary epistemology"
has been used by many people to mean a variety of things. One common
Interpretation f lhe plu f<e i Uutt an evoluri nary epi temuk>gy prnvid ·
a biological accou.tH of beli f.. Thi is not the t pe of evoluti nar-y
ep· ·temol gy with which we will be concern -cl here. ln. t ad, we wil l ocus
on th· 1t of e olurio nary .epislern logy popul ri.zoo -,y Dona ld · am.pbell,
an ev ILUi nary epi, l mology which ha,, as il ''centra in ig.ht . . , lha:t
biological natura l· elect' n, r .~o me o ther 1· imilarl se lection proccs ·
involving the real w r id edit and . elects amo n variation p ovidi ng the
1t belw e n b lief or knowled g amd the real world" ( ampbell 1977, p.
Biology and Philosophy 4 ( 1989) 33 - 56.
© 1989 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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JO· . mpbeU 1974a). For ampbell. evolutiona.ry biology does not it el
provide a cu mprehen ivc theor >f knowledge but ii p ovides. a model for
such a theory.' H begin h.i ' approach to olmionary epi. temology by
lookfn11 l three ex mple of I.he pr blem of fit: biolo i , I evolu tion , vi uaJ
p rce plion 11d lh d v,fopment o · sci nt i, knowledge, How can w
exp! in the fit b tween organism and euvironmenc? How can w e ·plain
the fit between ur visual perceplion of th t! world and th way Lhe world
i ·? Ho can w explain the fit b ·1ween ci · Mi 1c th orie. an the world
they describe? According to Campbell, all three problems have the same
solution: trial and error, natural selection, or, more specifically, blind
variation and selective retention. All three "marvelous" fits can be best
explained by natural selection.
The three major components of the model of natural selection are
variation, selection and retention. In the modern Darwinian theory of
biological evolution, genetic mutations provide the variations, the environment provides the selection, and reproduction provides the retention. The
variations are not pre-designed. Rather, fit is achieved only through the
hindsight of the selection process. In biological evolution, this amounts to
saying that the mechanism of variation is not influenced by the effects the
variations would have. The likelihood of a mutation is not correlated with
the benefits or liabilities that mutation would confer on the organism.
Rather, those organisms with features which make them less fit for survival

do not :t1rv:ive in comp tition wi1h othe organi ms in tn en ironm nt
'I hich h ve featur , that are more fit. Ev lutionary epis.temology Ucmpt
to appl lhi • blind ariation and · le t ive rc t •nlion mod 11 1 th groWlh of
. cicnlific knowhlge and lo human th ught pr es~• · in general. In his
es y, we will talk primadl bout . cicntific knowled
but what w say

will als apply to gener I nowtedgc. We fo us on cientific knowledge
because, in scie:nce, the separation bctwet.m variatfon and selection is
clearer, and we want to focus our discussion only on variation and not
selection.
1n lhi: es ay, we will di cu s j ust one o the major cliaU ng fa ing
i.:volutionary epi ·temology - how to , xplain Inc appare-nt guidedn ss of
the varit1tion thal i ld hypothese lhal re candi d.ates f< r testing. inc
ev lutionary pistemolo y attempt tn e tabli h a r lation betwe n bi logica l and ,e pistcmjc evolu1iot1, an imm diate diffi ult i • that biological

evoluLion :eems lo involv blind variation · hile epi lemi ,,,, lution se m!t
to iuvolvi; guided variation. G nelic change i, riot infl uenced by the needs
of th org ni. 111, but the pr d uction o new hypotheses by a . dentist
eem. )bviou.sly infl u.enc d b}r 1..bc problem she i trying lo solve. lf the
volutionary epi ·temologi 1 i • going to Hrgue. fo a strong analog b lween
biol gical and pi~temic e ol ution he m ust provide eithe r an account of
ho epi. I mic var:iali ns eem guided bu t are in fac:1 bJind, ran ac,eount
o how biolo •ical variations ,-;e m blind bu1 ar in facl guided. We will do

WHERE GUESSES COME FROM

35

both, primarily arguing that epistemic variation is blinder than it seems,
but also arguing that biological variation is more guided than it seems. We
will explore two accounts of epistemic variation: the appeal to hidden
chaos, which says that variations seem guided only because their underlying
randomness is supressed, and the appeal to epistemic preadaptation,
which says that the variations are guided, in that they are restricted by
heuristics, but that these heuristics are themselves retained from a process
that was mostly random. In other words, guided variation comes from
retention - the retention of heuristics which are produced by previous
variations. We will argue that not only do these two accounts work
together to characterize the actual blindness and the seeming guidedness
of epistemic variations, but, further, that they are analogous to biological
mutation and biological preadaptation. H{dden chaos is the epistemic correlate of biological mutation and epistemic preadaptation is the epistemic
correlate of biological preadaptation. Just as biological mutations and
biological preadaptations combine to explain biological variations, hidden
chaos and epistemic preadaptation combine to explain epistemic variations.
Our discussion will proceed in the following manner. First, we will
discuss variation in biology. We will note that biological evolution involves
both strictly random variation and variation guided by preadaptation. 2 We
will then discuss the parallels in epistemic variation: hidden chaos and
epistemic preadaptation. In our discussion of epistemic preadaptation, we
will consider the problem of innate heuristics - if we have certain
biologically innate restrictions on our epistemic variation, evolutionary
epistemology may be false. We will argue that such innate heuristics do in
fact exist, that they are consistent with evolutionary epistemology, and that
they do not occur in large enough numbers to trivialize evolutionary
epistemology. We will conclude with a discussion of some objections to
this view of epistemic variation.

II. BIOLOGICAL VARIATION

The details of biological variation help to explain the seeming guidedness
of epistemic variation. Before Darwin's theory of natural selection was
proposed, many people supposed that the amazing fit between organism
and environment was due to the work of an intelligent creator. The
argument from design used complex natural structures as evidence for the
existence of a supernatural creator of the universe. The argument usually
took the form of an analogy. Suppose you were walking along the beach
and came upon a watch; after studying the watch, you noted its precise
design, a design which could have only come to be if this watch were
designed to work in a certain way. You would reason that this watch was
created by somebody who intended it to fulfill a certain function, that of
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keeping time. he argument from design (:ompares th watch l the
human eye. The eye like th watch; i a preci e complex in. trumenl 1hat
perform. a particular r\lnction with great accuracy and dependa bility. How
could the yo be as it is unles lt wa designe by an intelligent ere lor?
Darwin
course·, had an an wer: he tgued I.hat the process o evolution
through flaturnl .elect.ion, a pr ces with no inten1ionaJ or inteUigentt
rcalor behind i . could pro .uce an ye. Blind variation and selectiv.e
retention is a mechanism that can do God's work. The claim that the
amazing fit between organism and environment is due to concealed
random processes is central to biology and to the analogy that evolutionary epistemology exploits.
Daniel Dennett provides a useful thought experiment which shows how
fit can result from unseen randomness:
bi lhou£}11 experiment is im,p1red hy one of the mosl elegant ~nd instdiou~ of Ltie
clas ic coil games; it probabty al.ready has a na.m,c:, but 1101 Jmowlrig i11 I. caJl it 1he
lolllifl.\l p 1ramiq, You obtain ;i mailing Ii t f eriou~ JY1mbl r , dJvidc: ii in hoJI; and
send one nalf 1hc prediction thal l:cam A wWwin lhe champion hip nex1 1 ,eek, an.J he
olhcr half 111e prc:J[otio.n thal te.1m A wm lose, A week hllc:r, half y ur mailing list Im.
rccc:ivcd a true prediction from you - free of charge. Dls~-urd the other h~ lf o[ the
mailing Ii~ diYid:c: lite remaindc: r in ialf again, and send 111 n a ~1.v1:1d brace o[
complcmcn tary p:redlcUori ·; lhis culs down )'O!t:i r pool , r ucken but now tht..-y h11va Iwo
'proof." of your c.laif\'())'rulCe. After <I (c:w more "·ucccsses n yoo announce lha1 the: free
!rial perilid is over; for)' ur nex:t predlc1ion tile)' will h.a,re co pay. (Dennett 19!14, p. 93
footnote:)

The same sort of phenomenon occurs in biological evolution: since we
only see those organisms which survive, we are like one of Dennett's
"suckers". Because a sucker does not know about all the wrong predictions which are sent out, he thinks the con man knows in advance which
team wil1 win. Similarly, we think that evolution i ·. purposeful, bul it is not
- n lure is only gu sing. Only when he looks at the larger pictun: can a
sucker. that b 1s being conned; nly when we look al th larger piclur
c ,fl. we see l1:ow ra dom variati n is producing organi 'm which are fit.
Just a·, the pyramid lheory d fu es the argument th l the con-man mu"t
know h wilJ win ·inc h made a ·tring of C<Jrrect predic1io11s Darwin
theo-ry defu.
the argument from de ign. Th rh,cory of natural ~ lection
defu
the inference from design to d igner nor just hecaus it provide
an altern tive e-xplanation of desigu and so . how · thal the infore.nce to a
supernatural designer is not obligatory, but also because Darwin's theory
is more plausible than the argument from design. Darwin's theory does not
require positing things for which we have no good evidence. The argument
from design involves a being of unimaginable powers, while the theory of
natural selection involves forces that we observe today, forces that are
easily explained.
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In addition to the virtue of greater plausibility that comes from
appealing to more mundane entities and processes, Darwin's theory is
more plausible because it is more explanatory than the appeal to God. The
appeal to God has an explanatory weakness shared by all straightforward
intentional explanations: the pattern to be explained is used in the
explanation as an intentional object. This does not make such explanations
worthlessly circular, but it does make them fairly superficial. The design in
nature is explained by appealing to that same design in God's mind. By
contrast, as Robert Nozick has observed, explanations like Darwin's go
deeper, because they can account for a pattern without appealing to that
pattern itself in any form (Nozick 1974, p. 18-19).
The theory of natural selection does, however, face various anomalies.
One of these, which will be of special importance to our discussion of
evolutionary epistemology, is the problem of complex organs. It is virtually
impossible for a single mutation to occur that would produce a complex
organ such as a wing, since many different genes are involved. The
probability that the necessary number of mutations would occur simultaneously, in a coordinated fashion, is infinitely small. So it appears that
the natural selection model cannot account for the evolutionary development of these organs.
This anomaly can be resolved by what biologists call 'preadaptation.' 3
In answer to the question "How do we get a complex structure like a
wing?", biologists say that there are simpler intermediate structures which
occurred before the wing. But this does not seem to solve the problem,
unless these intermediate structures themselves have some adaptive
advantage. If the intermediary structure had no adaptive function, then it
would generally tend not to be retained and so could not lead to a wing.
Obviously, the half-wing could not enable its possessor to fly (otherwise, it
woul d be considered a wing). There nm. t b an adaptive advao1, ge of a
pre-winged bird having a half-wing structure. The biologist's answer is to
give an account of the half-wing's preadaptive function. For example, the
half-wing may have been used for trapping insects. For biologists, the
move to preadaptation allows them to explain how a complex organ may
have evolved; it does so by claiming that the structure evolved from an
"ancestor" of the organ which may have had a different function.
In summary, biological variation primarily involves two sorts of explanations for how features of organisms come into being: regular random
mutations and preadaptations. Note that neither explanation alone will
suffice. Random mutations without biological preadaptation do not provide
a good explanation for complex organs since the chances of mutations
alone producing complex organisms are infinitesimally small. Biological
preadaptation without random mutations is no different from the argument
from design - without random mutations behind them, the preadaptations
themselves would be inexplicable.

EDWARD STEIN AND PETER LIPTON
III. EPISTEMIC VARIATION

Like fl] biologic I inspiration, i:volutioriary epistemology faces various
anomalie . P rhap Lhe most cons icuous is tha t pisll.lntic va ation - the
prod uction f new hypolh
- seem · _anything but random. If cientific
conjectur · we.r rea ll y random, it would be a miracle that Lh astronomer
who ~enerate
n ·~ onj~clur,e usu, lly manages 10 produce a ca.odidat
hypoLhe. i · about teroid ' ralh r than about steroid . And, of coul'se, the
ielltisL doe much t lter than mer ly g uio th e field light: lh variation
in science appears tiglltry guided. Thi.q ' eems a dramati isanalogy t t.h
blin n · of biological variation, lhus c lling volut:ionary epi temology
irHo que Llon. Our vi w is lhd the claimed Ii ·analogy does no exist. he
appearance to l e conlrnry r t • in part n tn overly imple picture of
iological volution, a picture which do
not t Ice .into account the
coormou. role of biological preaclaptalion. \ •e will argue that evolutionary
epistemology can account for the apparent guidedness of variation, and
that the central mechanism of that explanation is itself analogous to the
mechanism of biological preadaptation that saved Darwin's theory from
the anomaly of complex organs.
·
The remainder f this paper. ;vhich contains our e plan •lion for the
apparent guidednes of epis temic va · tion,, fall. into :live parts. F i ·t. we
consider th · e>.tent t which thi guidedn s i · only pparenl: the variation
i in ad blind or chaolic but.. for various rea ons the chao i hidden.
. econd, we bow .huw the uidednes that actually exi t - can
accounted
for by appea l epi temic prcadapt tions in Lh form of heuri, tic and we
discus, ome of !he form - these h:euri li · take. hird , we consid r the
m~hani in by which these heuristi - themselve we e g nerated. We will
argue lhal most of them are based n h.id n chao ·, (i.e., that 1hese
heuristic. have been retained from ea Ji r blind variation) but s-ome may
be innate , an. l we will consider how an evolUlfonary episl mology ought to
1reat this innate componcnl. Fourth , we will evaJuate the . lrength of the
analogy be tween biol gical and epistemic preadaptation by givino a
positi c account of it. Fi ,1Uy, we will consider om objections to th,e
analogy bclw en biological and epi. l mic variation.
Our first r ponse lo the see.ming gu"dednes. of epjst~rnic evolution i.
L laim hat iL i , like the seeming guided ess of bi.ological evolution, only
appasent: both can be e p.lai ed by unseen randomness of Lhe sort
exemplified in lhe louting pyramid . Th analogy is ru follow . . Before
Darwin, the common intufl ion wa that the amazing fil bet v . n species
and lhe environmenL i • the re:ull of a guided intem.g nt p:roc · -~ after
Darwin, pecies are een to be the r ult o rand m variation coupled with
election and retention. imilarly in the case of epistemic evolution,
before ev luti nary epistemol~gy. th common intuition. was tha:t idea.
and . cicntifi discoveries are tbe resnlt · guided in elligeo1 proces
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after evolutionary epistemology, they are seen to be the result of random
variation. 4 The first response thus involves a straightforward appeal to
hidden chaos - the variation is blind but the blindness is hidden. ln the
touting pyramid, the chaos is hidden because the suckers do not receive
any of the wrong predictions - they do not yet see that the con man is not
clairvoyant. In biological evolution, the chaos is hidden because we do not
see all of the mutations (many of them fatal) that took place hundreds or
thousands of years ago. In epistemic evolution, according to the appeal to
hidden chaos, the chaos is hidden for a variety of reasons. 5 Here we will
only sketch some of the ways that it could possibly be hidden.
In order to see three of the ways that the randomness could be hidden,
we will consider the hypothetical case of a scientist who has developed a
theory T about the world. If we watch this scientist, we will think that she
came to believe in T by an intelligently guided process. This, however, may
only be an illusion. First, there may have been some unconscious variation
going on in her mind. She may have unconsciously thought of many
different theories, but only one enters her consciousness. Second, she
might have consciously considered many alternative theories before she
settled on T, but forgotten these pondered alternatives. The chaotic
speculation would be hidden from her because she only remembers
thinking about T. Third, it might be that she came upon T as a result of an
accident or a lucky guess, but that afterwards she, for the sake of her
peers, made up justifications for it, thereby hiding the fact that T was
randomly derived. The random roots of T would thus be hidden behind
her post hoc explanations. These are just three of the different ways that
the randomness of variation might be hidden to the observer. Like
Dennett's touting pyramid, they provide accounts of what is happening
behind the scenes that makes a random process seem guided; as with
Dennett's con man, the scientist's bad guesses may be supressed.
But these simple appeals to hidden chaos are not enough. Earlier we
discussed the anomaly of complex organs that occurs on the simple
account of biological evolution - it is highly implausible that a single set
of simultaneous mutations should produce such complex structures. A
similar anomaly occurs in evolutionary epistemology. It is implausible that
a single instance of hidden chaos could produce such a complex hypothesis as a detailed scientific theory. It seems wild to suppose that Kepler
generated his laws through simple hidden chaos. Just as random mutations
alone do not explain complex organs, hidden chaos alone does not explain
our complex beliefs. Inspired by the biologist, the evolutionary epistemologist resolves this anomaly with an appeal to epistemic preadaptation.
Epistemic preadaptations may act to guide the variation that yields
hypotheses. Like the half-wing of biological preadaptation, the epistemic
preadaptation had to be good for things other than its current adaptive use
(or, at least, not harmful), otherwise, it would not have been adopted in
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the first place. Just as the half-wing was a pre-wing structure which was
good for something other than flight, so the epistemic preadaptation is
good for something other than what the hypothesis it precedes is good for.
The epistemic variation that preadaptation is supposed to explain
concerns the production of candidate hypotheses for testing. When these
hypotheses are not generated randomly, we can call whatever guides or
restricts their production a heuristic. Of course not all heuristics govern
the production of hypotheses: we rely on them in most of our other
epistemic activities as well. For example, we have heuristics that guide us
in the testing of hypotheses and others that guide us in the acquisition of
new hypotheses that require no testing since they have been deduced from
previous hypotheses. But the heuristics that concern us in this essay are
just those that guide us in acquiring hypotheses that we will then go on to
test, since they are the ones whose existence seems to call the analogy to
biological variation into question. In science, these are the heuristics that
operate in the "context of discovery", where conjectures are found , as
opposed to the "context of justification", where they are tested. Accordingly, we call these heuristics "discovery heuristics". The two major
questions about discovery heuristics concern their nature and their source.
We will discuss these in turn.
As a hypothetical example, consider a chemist who is trying to discover
why a particular compound behaves in a particular way. In her search, she
would not make a random conjecture and start to refute it, as might be
predicted by an evolutionary epistemology relying only on the appeal to
hidden chaos. Rather, she would draw on a panoply of heuristics which
she has developed in part from her previous chemical experience. Perhaps
she would consider explanations for the behavior of other similar compound , dr wing her conj,ecture from the.~e. In d ing s , she L making
certain assumptions: she is assuming that the other compound is in fact
similar, she is assuming induction (namely, that past experiences with this
and similar compounds will be repeated in the future), etc.
Given our broad notion of a heuristic as anything that restricts variation, there should be many specific types of discovery heuristics. In this
essay we can only briefly discuss three: abstract rules, concrete rules, and
exemplars. Abstract rules are discovery heuristics that apply to many areas
of inquiry. Some of these rules are explicit, in the sense that they are ones
a scientist could be expected to volunteer or at least to acknowledge as
her own as soon as they are presented. The actual content of particular
discovery heuristics is not important to our argument, but perhaps some
examples are that hypotheses should be potential solutions to the problem
at hand , that they should be tractable with the tools of the discipline, and
that they should be testable. These explicit rules may seem vague or vapid,
but they are clearly highly restrictive as compared to strictly random
variation. There are presumably also many general rules with more
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articulated and restricting content, but most of these must be implicit or
tacit, since scientists do not volunteer them, psychologists have not
discovered them, and philosophers cannot agree about them. For example,
there are presumably various abstract features of a hypothesis that give it
the sort of simplicity and coherence that help to make it a promising
conjecture, and the scientist may be supposed to have tacit rules that guide
him to produce conjectures with these features.
Unlike abstract rules, concrete rules are field-specific discovery heuristics. They tell scientists to favor conjectures that bear certain relationships to other theoretical claims in the discipline. Many concrete rules can
be seen as rules for modifying old hypotheses to produce new ones. When
a previously established hypothesis is judged to be unacceptable, it is
rarely rejected without a trace. Typically, the old hypothesis provides a
strong constraint on the form that its replacement will take. In the simplest
case, the rule would be that the new hypothesis should be as similar to the
old one as the data will allow. The same sort of rule often appears to be
applied in larger scale theory change: the new theory should not only
entail the old data, it should also entail an approximation of the old
theory. 6 To make the contrast with abstract rules more vivid, we may say
that it is the old hypothesis itself that provides the concrete rule which acts
to restrict variation, though the scientist can only be expected to have tacit
knowledge of the many ways the old hypothesis constrains the new one.
The last type of discovery heuristic we will discuss has been emphasized
by Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 1970, passim, especially the postscript). A
scientist uses a canonical solution in her field as a concrete model for new
solutions. This exemplar focuses the scientist's attention on new putative
solutions that she perceives as similar to the exemplar. The similarity
relations the exemplar creates sharply restrict the variation the scientist
undergoes in solving her problem. Indeed, if Kuhn is right, they also
determine what problems she will attempt to solve. 7 Unlike abstract rules,
exemplars are highly field-specific; unlike concrete rules, exemplars are
particular solutions that remain entirely acceptable rather than general
hypotheses or theories that usually need to be modified. Like the two
other types of discovery heuristics, exemplars partially account for the
directed character of epistemic variation.
Having given a sketch of the nature of some discovery heuristics, we
turn now to their source. Although these heuristics help to explain why
epistemic variation is restricted, heuristics alone cannot provide a complete explanation. Just as biological mutations and biological preadaptations must work together to explain away the seeming guidedness of
biological variation, hidden chaos and epistemic preadaptation must work
together to explain away the seeming guidedness of epistemic variation. In
biology, the half-wing appeared as a result of a random genetic mutation.
Similarly, a non-innate preadapted heuristic must be the result of hidden
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chaos, otherwise it seems that evolutionary epistemology will not work.
Epistemic preadaptation thus involves admitting that not every conjecture
is completely unguided; some are guided by preadapted heuristics,
generalized rules of thumb developed from past experiences. The nonrandomness of some acts and some scientific discoveries is attributed to
heuristics which are themselves retained from previous blind variation and
selective retention and can be considered "already achieved wisdom of
some general sort" (Campbell 197 4a, p. 422). Thus we must distinguish
the question of the source of our hypotheses from the question of the
source of the heuristics that help to generate them. Because of heuristics,
the generation of a hypothesis may not be random or blind; but this leaves
open the possibility that some of the heuristics come from blind variation.
As a hypothetical example, consider a scientist who makes a conjecture
C guided by a certain heuristic H 1 • Where did this scientist come up with
H 1? Evolutionary epistemology says that H 1, if not innate, must be the
result of a blind variation and selective retention process. However, there
remain two possibilities: H 1 might have been actually blindly selected, or
H 1 might have been selected on the basis of another heuristic H 2 (a metaheuristic). The same is true with H 2 - there can be a nested hierarchy of
heuristics - and there seems to be a possibility of an infinite regress, a
regress which must come to an end if evolutionary epistemology is going
to work. The regress can be prevented if the appeal to epistemic preadaptation is qualified; the qualification is that, ultimately, behind every
instance of preadaptation not based on an innate heuristic, there is a case
of hidden chaos. In other words, each non-innate conjecture, though it
may be based on many levels of heuristics, must ultimately be based on a
blind guess. Thus, we see that the two responses to the challenge against
the blindness claim (hidden chaos and epistemic preadaptation) come
together. A seemingly guided discovery is attributed to blind variation in
one of two ways: either the discovery is viewed as a result of hidden chaos,
or as a result of guided processes based on heuristics retained from
previous variation, ultimately stemming from hidden chaos.
In the last two paragraphs, we have qualified evolutionary epistemology
by restricting our discussion to non-innate heuristics; we leave open the
possibility of there being innate heuristics. If, however, there are certain
heuristics that are innate, then it looks as though evolutionary epistemology
is false, since there would then be heuristics that do not have their source
in blind variation. For example, if Noam Chomsky is right in claiming that
we have an innate capacity to learn a certain type of language, then the
acquisition of language would be based on a set of innate heuristics,
principles genetically programmed into all humans. Similarly, it may be
that some heuristics that govern scientific practice, such as some sort of
inductive heuristic, are innate. Many evolutionary epistemologists have
been tempted to respond to this problem with an appeal to blind variation
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and selective retention at the biological level. They argue that epistemic
variation can still be blind even when preadaptation traces back to an
innate trait in humans if the innate trait can be attributed to the blind
variation of biological evolution. As an example, let us consider an
imaginary dialogue between an evolutionary epistemologist (EE) and one
who is skeptical of evolutionary epistemology (SK).
EE: Knowledge processes and the growth of science are instances of
blind variation and selective retention.
SK: But when I put words together to make sentences, there is no blind
groping going on. In order to make myself understood, I form
sentences without any blind variation.
EE: That is because you have developed, through a process that I call
epistemic preadaptation, heuristics for communicating, for forming
sentences. These preadapted heuristics were arrived at through a trial
and error process. At first, you tried to communicate without a
regular grammar, but you found that no one did what you ':"anted
them to do. Through trial and error you found that if you asked for
something in a certain way, you were more likely to get it. So, while
you do not go through the trial and error process each time you
speak, you do use techniques (heuristics) which you acquired
through blind variation and selective retention.
SK: But what if the ability to use and acquire language is innate in
humans? If this is the case, then there is no trial and error in the
ability to acquire and use language. A set of innate principles of
language is genetically programmed or "hard-wired" into humans.
EE: But this ability became hard-wired in humans through genetic evolution. The innate ability to acquire language, if there is such an ability
in humans, came to be innate through genetic mutation and natural
selection.
This line of thought seems to save evolutionary epistemology because
biological evolution brings in the blind variation and selective retention
that is needed to save the analogy. However, we think that this appeal to
the blindness of biological variation creates a disanalogy between biological and epistemic evolution and makes evolutionary epistemology trivial.
First, this appeal creates a disanalogy between epistemic and biological
evolution. It pictures biological evolution as blind on its own level, while
epistemic evolution is not blind in its own terms, but only blind by proxy,
because it rests on the truly blind biology. By using biology both as an
analogy and as a partial direct explanation, the strength of the analogy
is weakened. Second, this appeal reduces the claim of evolutionary
epistemology simply to the claim of the truth of Darwinian evolutionary
theory. For if the appeal to biological variation is a legitimate one, then
regardless of what occurs at the epistemic level, if biological evolution is
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blind, then so is epistemic evolution. Consider, for example, the possible
world in which biological evolution is true, but all our beliefs 8 (that is, all
the beliefs that we will ever have) are innate. In this possible world, all of
our thoughts are guided (in fact, they are preprogrammed), while all
biological evolution is blind, non-guided, etc. The appeal to the blind
variation of biological evolution can still be made; the only difference
would be that all the beliefs of these completely guided beings are like the
innate capacity for language which we are claimed to have. In other words,
if the appeal to biological variation is a legitimate way of saving the blind
variation claim of evolutionary epistemology, then none of the other
claims of the theory is needed; hidden chaos and epistemic preadaptation
need not be true for evolutionary epistemology to be true. We do not,
however, want to count an epistemology. as evolutionary if its only source
of blindness is biological variation. There are two versions of evolutionary
epistemology involved here. The one we are defending claims that epistemic evolution is analogous to biological evolution. This is a strong and
interesting claim, particularly if the analogy is spelled out, as we are here
attempting to do, at least partially. The second version, the version on
which the appeal to biological variation is based, claims that epistemic
evolution comes from biological evolution. In the sense that this claim is
normally understood, it is epistemically empty: it amounts only to the
biological claim that we are a product of natural selection. Therefore, the
appeal to biological variation is not a legitmate way to save evolutionary
epistemology from attacks against the blindness claim because it trivializes
evolutionary epistemology.
We are not disturbed by the trivializing result of the appeal to biological
variation because we think that this move is not necessary to preserve the
analogy between biological and epistemic evolution and to handle the
objection that some heuristics may be innate. In fact, the distinction
between innate and acquired beliefs is, we think, the saving grace of
evolutionary epistemology. To begin with, evolutionary epistemology has
no responsibility to explain genetic traits of organisms. Evolutionary
epistemology just involves the claim that beliefs evolve in the same way
that biological species do; innate heuristics need not be explained by
evolutionary epistemology. It is perfectly consistent for an evolutionary
epistemology to leave the explanation of such innate heuristics to biology;
evolutionary epistemology only has to explain those heuristics which are
acquired. Further, evolutionary epistemology need not deny that acquired
beliefs are often partially rooted in innate heuristics - this does not mean
that epistemic variation is not predominantly blind. The upshot of this is
that heuristics can have a "mixed parentage"; they can be based on blind"
epistemic variation as well as genetically innate heuristics.
What does this clarification of evolutionary epistemology say about
epistemic preadaptation? Recall that the appeal to epistemic preadapta-
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tion was made in order to save the claim that epistemic variation is blind.
On the clarified view, this move is still necessary and legitimate. The
appeal to biological variation was made in order to save the claim that
epistemic variation is blind even in light of innate beliefs. On the clarified
view, this move is not necessary, because it is no curse or surprise that
some heuristics and hypotheses are linked to innate characteristics; the
acquired component of epistemic variation can still be seen as blind.
Chomsky's account of language provides a good example of mixed
parentage. The universal grammar provides the elements and principles
that are common to all possible human languages. Chomsky (1986)
distinguishes between an internalized language (I-language) and a target
language. A target language is the language actually spoken while an
I-language is some element in the mind of a user of a language. Chomsky
has switched the search for the universal grammar from the target
language to the I-language. He interprets universal grammar "as the theory
of human I-languages, a system of conditions deriving from the human
biological endowment that identifies the I-languages that are humanly
accessible under normal conditions" (Chomsky 1986, p. 23). The universal
grammar is "a characterization of these innate, biologically determined
principles, which constitute one component of the human mind - the
language faculty" (Chomsky 1986, p. 24). In our terms, the universal
grammar, the innate capacity for language, is an example of a set of innate
heuristics. The universal grammar restricts epistemic variation - certain
"languages" are not humanly possible because of this restriction. The set of
innate heuristics plus non-innate heuristics, acquired rules of language,
together produce the actual language that we speak, our target language.
The I-language isolates the innate component of language, but acquiring
an target language requires setting particular parameters within the constraints of the I-language. Since the innate component does not determine
the target language, it remains open to the evolutionary epistemologist to
claim that the particular target language comes from selection from among
those target languages which are compatible with the I-language. The
example of universal grammar thus provides an excellent example of
the innate heuristics and the "mixed parentage" of certain epistemic
entities.
Our view, then, is that discovery heuristics may be either innate or
randomly generated and, if innate, the evolutionary epistemologist ( qua
EET-type evolutionary epistemologist) has nothing to say about them.
This avoids the trivialization of evolutionary epistemology, but it may
create a new problem. We do not want to purchase the benefit of
falsifiability at the cost of falsification. If all heuristics are innate, this
would seem to refute our version of evolutionary epistemology, or at least
make it vacuous. One reply would be to argue that even if all heuristics are
innate, there is still a mixed parentage that allows for evolutionary
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~pi tecnoiogy since the heuristic: only detemuoe th .· ange within which
conjectur · wilJ falJ and variali n within th.al range is random.9 t ler an,
different scicnti
make di feren t c nje.cture . Thi repl wouJd ive
volu :ioaary epistemology om role, but il would be d~appoiming as the
ole r p n
ince it would fail lo meet the objection that epistemic
variation is disan aJogous to biological variation, lhe ob.e<:t'on that m tivates tJ1i. e ·say. Of cou.rse,. this is primarily an empirical quesli, n: what
percentage o ur heuristic. are innate? If all u hcuri tics are in.oat ,
then evolutionary episte-moJogy (al least the EET-type which we are
doing)~ ould be falsrfied. rn fortunately, a slronge reply i · po. ibJe: n tall
ou heuristic~ are innate· many of them r t n hidden ch . ·. Below, we
present some considerations that suggest that most of our heuristics are
not innate.11
One argument for acquired heuristics rests on underdetermination.
Consider the set of all heuristics and beliefs that could plausibly be innate.
For example, certain beliefs about how to produce a grammatical sentence
are plausibly innate, but beliefs about phlogiston or black holes are not.
Add to this set all the actual beliefs that could be plausibly held to be
observational. This set of innate and observational beliefs underdetermines
the conjectures scientists produce; in other words, the actual conjectures
which scientists produce are not entailed by this set. Moreover, this set
also underdetermines the heuristics, in our broad sense of the term, that
scientists use. Scientific conjectures are much more severely constrained
than they would be if the innate constraints provided the only restriction.
It follows that many heuristics are not innate.
Another rela ted rea on why ii. seem.
likely th l th re are acquired
heuri.<;lic · i th at o many he urL lie · are fi kl specific, like the concrete
heuristi s and the exemplar· discu. · d above.
n suppo · '" that
I articular hypoth ~. heorie1., or exemplars. a innate o ntailed by lhe
data, nd Lite ·e are also heuristics. imila.rly, inc th ·e orts o h uri tics
hange over time with"n a single 1eld, they re almost cenainly not innate.
O u b~liefs and l:ieurisLics change much more rapidly than do our •ene .
Thoma, Kuhn' naly is of the role of exemplars in ·cience mak a
particularly vi "d ~ ~e for the claim that many heurisli re I on bl.in d
variation (' uhn 1970. passim). According lo him, n w exemplars are
generated when a scientific discipline goes into a protracted period of
crisis. If the old exemplars cannot be made to work, some scientists will
begju to search for replacem nt ', a carch whi.ch may culminate i.rt ;1
scientific revolution. But insofar as it is exemplars that guide scientists, and
new exemplars can only be discovered by suspending the old ones, the
search for new exemplars must be largely unguided. 12 Moreover, should
the search be successful, this unmethodical mechanism will be hidden
from view. After a revolution, much old research is re-presented as
flowing from the new exemplars, a practice that gives the illusion of
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cumulative scientific history based on fixed heuristics and so hides the
chaotic source of the current exemplars. In short, new exemplars must rest
on hidden chaos.
Having explained how the guidedness of epistemic variation is explained
by hidden chaos and epistemic preadaptation as well as some innate
heuristics, we will now step back and consider the strength of the analogy
between biological and epistemic evolution. We have already extensively
discussed the extent to which both involve the blind variation and selective
retention mechanism - this is the most central feature of the analogy. We
have also discussed the analogous anomalies that appear in biological and
epistemic evolution. Biological variation cannot offer a good explanation
of complex organs because the chances of strictly random mutations
producing such apparent fit are so small. Similarly, epistemic variation
cannot offer a good explanation of complex theories because the chances
of strictly hidden chaos producing such apparent fit are also quite small.
Further, we have seen that biological and epistemic evolution can solve
their respective anomalies by appealing to preadaptation. In the biological
case, a complex organ evolves from an earlier structure that was itself
adaptive; in the epistemic case, a complex conjecture evolves from an
earlier conjecture which we call a heuristic. In both cases, an infinite
regress is avoided because the preadaptations are ultimately based on
some truly random occurrence: in the biological case, a mutation was
behind the preadapted structure and in the epistemic case, hidden chaos
was behind the preadapted heuristic. Note that in both cases, the chaos is
doubly hidden - it is hidden originally through the hidden chaos, such as
that of the touting pyramid phenomenon, and then it is further hidden by
the levels of preadaptation.
The similarity of biological preadaptation and epistemic preadaptation
is underscored by our discussion of exemplars. Exemplars can be thought
of as old solutions grafted onto new problems. In this way, they are much
like biological preadaptations - old organs, which perform a function in
the old environment, are used for another task in the new environment.
In addition, exemplars determine what problems a scientist will tackle
(namely those which are similar to the exemplar problems) in a way very
much like the way a pre-organ structure restricts the sort of final organ an
organism will have.
An additional feature of the analogy is that both types of preadaptations can be viewed in two, quite compatible, ways: either as restrictions
on future variations or as programs for the generation of new variations.
In both the biological and the epistemic cases, preadaptations restrict
variation, but they also make certain variations possible. In biological
evolution, the appearance of the half-wing makes possible the appearance
of some structures, most notably a wing. At the same time, the appearance
of the half-wing prevents certain other structures from appearing - for
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example, an arm in place of the half-wing. In epistemic evolution, if a
person adopts a certain heuristic, then various future conjectures are made
possible, but others are made impossible or overwhelmingly unlikely.
One possible disanalogy between biological and epistemic variation that
seems to have appeared can be turned into another analogous feature
between the two. In biological evolution, all adaptations are ultimately
based on strictly random mutations. In contrast, in epistemic evolution,
some (though if our argument above is correct, relatively few) of the
preadaptations are innate. The possibility of innate heuristics seems to
create a disanalogy, since there does not on the surface seem to be a
biological correlate to an innate epistemic preadaptation. This disanalogy
dissolves if we recall that a heuristic is anything that guides the production
of future theories. Carrying this view of preadaptation back to biology, we
see that just as there may be certain innate heuristics that act to guide
epistemic variation, there are also innate restrictions on biological variation, what we call genetic heuristics. The notion of genetic heuristics can
be seen in two ways, depending on whether we look at phenotypic
variation or genotypic variation. If we look at genotypic variation, we see
that the structure of genes and DNA act as genetic heuristics. Certain
biological variations are precluded because genetic strnctures act to
restrict variation. If we look at phenotypic variation, we see that genetic
heuristics preclude certain variations because they are fatal. Certain
mutations, such as those which would lead to the absence of a heart in a
mammal, are eliminated before the organism comes into being and so
cannot show up as phenotypic variations. These genetic heuristics at the
level of phenotypic variation restrict biological variation as well. In parallel
to our broad definition of epistemic heuristics, genetic heuristics are the
restrictions on biological variation. Following this line, we might say that
biological evolution is built on some genetic heuristics which are, for
example, chemical in nature. In other words, certain chemical structures
need to evolve before biological evolution can begin. Thus, the disanalogy
becomes an analogy: the innate heuristics in epistemic evolution are
likened to genetic heuristics in biological evolution.

IV. OBJECTIONS

We will now go on to consider various objections to the explanation of the
apparent guidedness of epistemic variation and to the strength of the
analogy between biological and epistemic variation. Michael Ruse has
argued that by attributing the guidedness of epistemic variations to
epistemic preadaptation, evolutionary epistemology improperly locates the
analogy in such a way that it breaks down. Ruse says that even if the
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appeal to epistemic preadaptation were correct, evolutionary epistemology
would "locate the supposedly Darwinian element in science at the wrong
point to save the organism/ science analogy, as it is usually conceived"
(Ruse 1986, p. 59). More specifically, this objection sees evolutionary
epistemology as arguing for a relation between biological and scientific
entities, that is, beliefs about the world, or first-order beliefs. The move to
epistemic preadaptation changes part of the relation to one between
biological entities and heuristics, namely beliefs about beliefs or secondorder beliefs.
This objection, we think, rests on an overly restrictive view of evolutionary epistemology as well as on a fuzzy distinction between first-order
and "nth-order" beliefs. First, there is no reason for evolutionary epistemology to focus only on the relation between biological entities and
first-order beliefs. Rather, evolutionary epistemology should be viewed as
positing a relation between biological entities and beliefs at all levels (that
is, first-order beliefs, second-order beliefs, etc.). On this view of evolutionary epistemology, the appeal to epistemic preadaptation does not
locate the relation at the wrong level. Second, and we think more
strikingly, there is no clear-cut distinction between first-order and secondorder (or nth-order) beliefs. As Ruse (1986 , p. 59) describes it, evolutionary epistemology deals with particular scientific discoveries, such as
Watson and Crick's model of DNA. Ruse argues that if we locate the
analogy at the level of heuristics used by Watson and Crick, rather than at
the level of their particular discovery, then we are improperly locating the
analogy at the level of second-order beliefs. However, discoveries made by
cognitive psychologists are beliefs about beliefs (second-order beliefs), and
it seems that, in this case, Ruse would want the analogy to be located at
the second level since it is at this level that the discoveries of cognitive
psychologists are made. The point is that even if we accept Ruse's
suggestion to locate the analogy at the point of discovery, we are left with
an open question as to which level of belief the analogy applies. Further,
to return to two of the specific examples of discovery heuristics which we
discussed above, both concrete heuristics and exemplars are instances of
first-order beliefs that act as heuristics by restricting further epistemic
variation.
Ruse, however, has a simple response. Rather than making a distinction
by talking about levels of beliefs, he can do so by distinguishing between
the subject of inquiry and the method of inquiry. Ruse could argue that
evolutionary epistemology, through the move to epistemic preadaptation,
places the analogy at the wrong place. Rather than locating epistemic
variation at the subject of inquiry and comparing it to biological variation,
by making the move to epistemic preadaptation, evolutionary epistemology
locates epistemic variation at the level of both the subject and the method
of inquiry. The adjusted version of Ruse's argument is as follows:
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1. Variation in biology takes place at the level of genetic mutation.

2. Evolutionary epistemology, in order to explain the seeming guidedness of epistemic evolution, needs to make the appeal to epistemic
preadaptation.
3. The appeal to epistemic preadaptation locates epistemic variation at
two levels: at the subject of inquiry and at the method of inquiry.
4. From 1 and 3, the analogy between epistemic and biological
evolution breaks down because biological and epistemic variation
are different.
We think this argument fails ; it turns on dividing beliefs into two classes
(first& rder and nth~order), while leaving biology t1ndivided. However, it is
certainly possible to divide up biological variants in a manner similar to
the way Ruse divides epistemic variants. We could talk of two classes of
genes: regulator genes (that is, genes that affect other genes) and nonregulator genes (that is, all other genes . Th' divi. ion parallel. the divi i n
between the subj ct of inquiry and the mctl od of inquiry - in oLher
words the distinction between belie. and belief a.hour bdie · . Thus we
could say that biofogica •voluli n aLm locales the variation al wo level
and th . • nalogy L preserved . If • nd ho we di vidc biol ogi ca1 and
e pi ·temic enlili, ·· dep nd on or subjective vi ,wpoint that i il de end~
on how we want lo lo k al 1he matter. lt ·eem t:hal no philosophical
mileage c.an b gotten rom th.is ·ort of distinclfon.
Lel u illustrate tht point more clearly wi.t11 another hypothetical
example-. Suppose I have l · t my ke . . he firsl place thal l would look for
th m would. be my co l pocket~ lh search i not a random ne. Rath r,
my . earch i guid d by the heuristic H 1 which says: when l J.o e my keys,
it i high.ly likely th a1 left th em in my oat pockel. Howev , 1 H 1 re lly a
he uri ·tic or i it just a belief (a belief ab · ul my forgelful habit. 7 H 1, in
fact, i based on another hcurislic, H i: when I lo
. omeLhing, ii will
probably be found in the place Lhat I ft n leave it Hi is ulcimately ba.:ed
on the inductive heuristic Hi: pa l experience is a g1.1ide. to fature
ex:perienc . Where hould we locate rh • analogy in thi cas '? H 2 seem · to
be both a b lief about the world and a heuri tic, ·ince it guides lhe
var.iation thal produc H 1,
Another response to our adjusted version of Ruse's argument would be
to attack premise 1 directly. Saying that variation in biology only takes
place at the level of g netic mutaLion is 10 ignor~ the fact llrnl there xist
genetic heuristics, innate restrictions on biological variation. Genetic
heuristics such as chemical preadaptations, for example, limit biological
variation. The existence of heuristics at levels other than biological
mutations is in direct opposjtion to premise 1. T h se geneli heuristic
parallel the innate heuristics of epistemic variation and thus save the
analogy. Thus, Ruse's argument, even if revised to make it stronger, does
not eem t< do any damag lo the appeal l epist mi preadaptat ori.
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Peter Skagestad argues that while the move to epistemic preadaptation
may save the notion of the blindness of epistemic variation, it does so at
the cost of undermining the central analogy of evolutionary epistemology.
He argues that epistemic preadaptation "... may well act in a manner
diametrically opposite to biological preadaptation" (Skagestad 1978, p.
615). He claims that a biological preadaptation increases the likelihood of
further adaptations, while an epistemic preadaptation often decreases the
likelihood of further adaptations by either leading its possessor to a
conceptual dead end or by getting its possessor stuck in a rut.
This objection, we think, is based on a misunderstanding of both
biological and epistemic preadaptation. Recall how preadaptation is used
by biologists to explain, for example, how an organism develops a wing.
The biologist's answer involves the existence of a pre-wing structure, a
half-wing, which had some preadaptive function. The move to biological
preadaptation explains how a complex organ evolved. Evolutionary epistemologists use the move to epistemic preadaptation to explain the seeming
guidedness of actions that they want to claim are the result of blind
variation. Like the biologically preadapted structure, the epistemically
preadapted heuristic had to have been good for something before its
current adaptive use.
Skagestad's objection is that a biological preadaptation increases the
possibilities of adaptation, while an epistemic preadaptation reduces them.
We think he is wrong in both cases. As we have already noted, both sorts
of preadaptations create the potential for new adaptations as well as
eliminating some of the previously existing potential for adaptations. For
example, when birds developed half-wings, the possibility of evolving
wings (and thus the possibility of flying) developed, but, the possibility of
using the structure that preceded the half-wing (the quarter-wing?) for
something else, say for picking up small sticks, disappeared (at least for
the moment - the quarter-wing may reappear, though the chances of this
are infinitely small). The same is true of epistemic preadaptations: when a
scientist develops a certain heuristic, a set of possible discoveries that are
based on that heuristic becomes available, but another set of previously
possible discoveries is ruled out in light of the heuristic. There are dead
end mutations in biology which sometimes get selected Gust as there are
heuristics which rule out good discoveries); we just do not usually call
them failed preadaptations. In other words, while biological preadaptation
suggests that the earlier organ enables variation, the presence of that organ
just as surely restricts variation. This is particularly vivid when we
consider animals that simply become extinct in a situation where different
animals would probably have been able to evolve to meet the situation.
The animals with the "right" preadaptations can adapt, while those with
the "wrong" preadaptations die. Whatever we choose to call them, it is
clear that in both biological and epistemic evolution there are variations
which are selected but that are not ultimately adaptive. Although we have
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mphasized th i.r re. triclive id • h uristics do make certain conjectures
more likely. By eliminating some alternatives, heuristics have the effect of
making the probability of other conjectures. In this way, heuristics, like
biological preadaptations, both eliminate an<l create possible variations.
Thus, biological and epistemic preadaptation act in the same manner and
the analogy is preserved.
Paul hagard ( 19 , pp. l - J90) an I W illiam B ln I ( 1984, p.

316) argue that while biologkal variation a.ri ·e truly independently of
th ir envirnntneni, epi tem ic varia tions d o nol. A ' Mi b el Brndie writ ,
". .• conjectur s and theori. , alth ugh Lhey may be blind with r•e ·pect to
their potential succ ·s ar nc l randomly generated with cspect to th e
nc cl of knowen; but are d veloped in. ce. ponse I a pro lematic environment" Bradie 19 6. p. 424). In other
rds, wi th epistemj variation1 the
source of the apparent d sign i· environmental pres. ures; lhe data we
have een up l now influ nee our next conjecture. This difference
ben eeo biological and epis temic volution has been conceded by at :lea. l
one evol utionary epi tem logi~t. Sl -ven Toulm in (197. •
37) ha
argued that thi disan logy i • explained by the fact that in pi temic
volulion vari.ttion and ·election ar coupled that i lhat 1-h . lection
fact r influer ce the ctors th at cau··e the variation. whil biological
va iation and election ar completely uncoup led in the occurrence of
-enetic muta ion is una ected by lhe environm nt.
oulmin does not . ee hi aban lonmenL of triclly blind variation for
variation guided by a coupled r lati n hip wi_th . election a destroying th
analogy betwe u epi. temi aod biological evol ution, because it preserves
both epistemic and biological variation and selection. L. J. Cohen (1973,
p. 48; 1974, p. 324) has argued that this is not enough; an evolutionary
epistemology with coupled variation and selection is not a true evolutionary epistemology. We agree with Cohen in thinking that Toulmin
drops uncoupled variation and selection far too quickly. At least as far
back as Willi am James, who expressed "no hesi tation whatever in holding
firm to the Darwinian distinction [of the uncoupledness of variation and
selection]" (James 1880, p. 456) even with respect to what he called
mental progress, people have denied that epistemic variations are influenced by their environment. James writes:
I can e.asdly show that throughou1 the wllole ex tent or tbose mental departments whkh
re higlte I ••• the new 4.-oncep!lons, emotions llilcl active tcudcmde.:, whlcb evol e 1:1re
origmally produced n the &hapc of r.mdom images, fandes, accidental oulbi.rth of
spmnaneou variation in tlie funclion a livhy of lhc exc.cssiveJy un.stal>lc human brain,
which the uulcr eoviroomeul simply confinns or re uies, dopts or rejects, preservi:s or
destroy - e,lccls in short, j u t as it selects morphological and ocl!,I varialion d11c to
molecular ac-cidc:nts of an anal.o,gou ort. (Jarne& 1&80, p. 446)

In fact, on our definition of heuristics, the coupling problem is nothing
new. To see this, let us return for a moment to our discussion of heuristics
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and preadaptation. The appeal to epistemic preadaptation was made in
order to explain the apparent guidedness of epistemic variation. The
heuristics gained through preadaptation are just restrictions on variation:
the more specific the heuristic, the more restricted the variation. Viewed
in this way, the problem which coupling is meant to answer can be
answered by the appeal to epistemic preadaptation. The data (the environment) influence the next conjecture (future variations); we do not need the
coupling of variation and selection to explain this. Data influence the
heuristics, which, in turn, restrict subsequent variation. This is the same in
biology where the environment influences preadaptations, which, in turn,
restrict future variations.
One further objection, made by both Thagard (1980, p. 190) and
David Hull (1982, p. 307) is that the agents involved in epistemic
variation want to solve a problem or accomplish a goal while the agents of
biological selection want no such things. Even if the desire of epistemic
agents does not guide variation, the mere fact that there is this desire
seems to create a disanalogy: a scientist wants to solve a problem, even if
her wants do not restrict variation. This is very different in biological
evolution, where the members of the evolving species do not generally
have any desires at all. As Thagard says, "The relevant difference between
genes and theories is that theories have people trying to make them
better" (Thagard 1980, p. 190). Because epistemic variation involves
intentions, while biological variation does not, the analogy seems to break
down.
Our response to this objection again involves the notion of the epistemic
preadaptation of heuristics. Does the fact that epistemic variation involves
intentions actually affect variation in any substantive way? If it has no
effect, then it does not cause a disanalogy. If it has an effect, the only
effect it could have is to restrict variation, in which case intentions can be
thought of as heuristics, for heuristics are nothing except restrictions on
variation. However, if these features can be thought of as heuristics, then
they can be explained as preadaptations. In the face of all of these
objections, we think that our resolution of the anomaly of guided variation
survives.

V. CONCLUSION

This essay was motivated by the claim that there is a fundamental
disanalogy between biological and epistemic evolution: biological variation
is blind, while epistemic evolution is not. The problems an organism faces
do not influence the new genotypes that will occur, but the problems
a scientist faces seem obviously to influence the hypotheses she will
propose. We have argued that this objection to evolutionary epistemology
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i · mi. guided., ome ep' ·temi • va i tion i unguided: ·ome of a r candidate
hypot.bese are in fac t produced quite blindly, Lh ugh thi · chaos is lau r
hidden for a vari ty of rea ons. [n th r (;a e , epislemic variation i.
restrict · I, bu t by a m~chani ·m lh· i analogo1,.1-ti lo bio logical preadaptation. In biotogi.c I ev lulion, comple organs evo lv fr m ther organ .
Th c, rlier preadap ta tiofl! 1nake complex organs po ·sible. They a l
effectively restl'i I biological variation, ince Lhe i .rm 1hat a comple ·
o rg n can 1ak is trordy infl uenced by tit part.ict!lar pre-adapialions
availabl , irnilarly, we have argued hat , ·pi tern.i _ varia tion L ten
r uicted by preoadaptaJions in rhe form of heuri Lie , and we ha e
uggested what some
these heuril tics are like. W ha , gone on to
disc us. the s urce of the. beuri. ti and have rgued that, ~ bile orne of
1hem al'e presumabl innate and o beyond lbe ken f proper y constJued evoluti,onary epi tern log,)', mo. t of them a.re ultimat ly ba.5ed on
blind variarion; lha1 ··, they are h uri. Li ·• reUlined fr in pre: iou · variation.
Danvln s theor explain the urpri!.ing fit between organi m anr.J
· virnnment in term$ of hidden randomness and lS lectiw reten tion;
ev lution~ ry episl m I gy u ' the same ort of m chani. m to e plain lh
surpri., ing fit betwe n belief · and the world. ln both ca e; w adlicv an
elegant and deep xpl _nation of the ay orde c n a.ri. e out. of chao .. In
both ·ase ; we mw \ also face the anomaly of apparcntJy guided variati n
- the pr >blem
comple r rgaru in biology and of intelligent conje u re
in cpistem · logy. What we have argued in this
ay is that both an mali~
can b · lved by an appeal to preadaptation, th applicati n of pPviou
adaplali tl · themf)elv
he res ult of chanc and inh ritanc . TI1c model of
rand c_m va i• lion and sdec tive retenti n i saved by howiag that what
ppears lo be non- random variati n i in fac t lhe r · ·ul t of e.lective
rel nl"on. ome conjeclur • re II arc guid ed, bu,t th guide are ·imply
parts of the inh ritan ce th l is an e . enliaJ eature f th e v lutionary
modet We have thu tlied I av the centra l claim of volutionar
epistemology w ile al lh e -·ame time prese ving 1.he slrong imuition that
1.h pmces · by ·hich u ienti. ts gen rate their hypotb
· is no l u ·ually a
random walk. We also hope l have provided some indication of the
r11.1itfu.ln s of n hin out ~h e analogy l:,etween episl•e mic anJ bio logic.al
volution,

NOTES

* We would like to thank Paul Bloom, Donald Campbell , Philip Clayton, Paul Pietroski,
Peter Skag~tad, Nicho las Thompson, 0 . L V:mkin, as1.lo Vt'r · nyi :ind 1wo a11ony1m usreferees for their helpful comments.
1
O ur dJ Hn~tion between olkring a b io logical explanatfon of belief and u~i ng biology , · a
model for a non-biological explanation parallels Michael Bradie's distinction between the
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evolution of cognitive mechanisms program (EEM) and the evolution of theories program
(EET) (Bradie 1986, pp. 403-413). In this terminology, our interest is in EET's. As
Bradie observes, however, the relationship between these two programs is complex, since
many of those who pursue the model approach also appeal to biology directly. That
is, they include some EEM inside their EET. Our version of EET will avoid this
complication.
2 The idea that the guidedness of epistemic preadaptations can be explained by something
analogous to biological preadaptations is discussed by Campbell (1974a, 1974b) and
Skagestad (1978).
3 Gould and Lewontin (1978), among others, have extensively criticized what they call the
adaptationist program. In particular, Gould has argued that 'preadaptation' is a bad word
for the phenomenon that we use it to refer to because it implies that the new use of the
structure was in some way anticipated. Instead, Gould recommends the use of the word
'exaptation'. We will use the more standard 'preadaptation', but it should be read as
synonymous to Gould's term, i.e., not as implying any foresight.
4
Setting up this parallel is not to gloss over the differences between pre-Darwinian
biology and pre-evolutionary epistemology. The pre-Darwinian view believes in perfect fit
and no variation. The pre-evolutionary epistemology view believes in some variation and
no blind variation. The pre-evolutionary epistemology view of epistemology is much like a
sophisticated teleological argument in biology which holds that there is variation, but that
this variation is guided.
5
Campbell (1974a) presents a variety of "testimonials" which give accounts of some of
the ways that the blindness of epistemic variation is hidden.
6
There is a large literature on this reduction relation between new and old theories. One
classic discussion is Ernest Nagel (1961), chapter 11. For a criticism of the traditional
view, see Kuhn (1970) especially chapter IX. Kuhn's stand on incommensurability leads
him to deny that new theories entail their predecessors as approximations, but he does
seem to allow for concrete rules. Thus, he says that "[s]ince new paradigms are born from
old ones, they ordinarily incorporate much of the vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual and manipulative, that the traditional paradigm had previously employed" (Kuhn
1970, p. 149),
7
Kuhn maintains that those periods of normal science where exemplars serve as heuristics
are not ones where theories are being tested. This may seem to disqualify exemplars as
discovery heuristics, since these heuristics are supposed to generate hypotheses to be
tested. But this may not be a serious problem. First of all, Kuhn has probably exaggerated
the extent to which the normal scientist accepts her theoretical framework without question. More importantly, even if the over-arching theories the scientist uses to solve her
problems are not up for testing, the particular solutions she proposes certainly are, and
these solutions are themselves hypotheses.
8
We use "belief" as a broad term meant to include accepted hypotheses and accepted
restrictions on epistemic variation; we do not, however, mean to count candidate hypotheses as beliefs.
9
Peter Skagestad (1978, pp. 615-616) defends such a view which he attributes to
Charles Sanders Peirce.
10
Another empirical question is that of those theories not generated by innate heuristics,
how many are generated by acquired heuristics and how many rest on hidden chaos?
11
There are presumably possible worlds in which creatures very much like us in all other
respects have all their heuristics and beliefs genetically hard-wired in them. The arguments
that follow support our intuitions that this world is not such a world.
12 It could be that the foundation of new exemplars is guided by some inter-paradigm
heuristics, but Kuhn's emphasis is rather on the absence of such things. Kuhn's point is that
if you overthrow the dominant paradigm together with its exemplars, what is left (e.g.,
inductive and deductive logic) radically underdetermines the new paradigm.
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